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The standard view about the relation between the Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches 
is that they are complementary to each other. My aim in this paper is to show that, on the 
contrary,  they  constitute  alternative  sub-research  programs  within  the  wider  neoclassical 
paradigm.  I  make  my  point  by  contrasting  the  two  approaches  against  the  following 
benchmarks: the purpose of economic theory according to Marshall and Walras, their views 
as to the role of mathematics, their ways of looking at the working of the economy as whole, 
the conception of equilibrium underpinning their theories and, finally, their trade organization 
assumptions. 
                                                 




Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) and Leon Walras (1834-1910) are the two towering historical 
figures of neoclassical theory. Although aware that these authors differed in purpose and 
methodology,  most  present-day  economists  think  that  these  differences  are  small  beer 
compared to their common endorsement of the neoclassical approach. In contrast, the aim of 
the present paper is to show that these differences are sufficiently important to warrant the 
conclusion  that  the  Marshallian  and  the  Walrasian  approaches  are  alternative,  not 
complementary, research programs within the broader neoclassical family.  
Though a minority view, the claim of a Marshall/Walras divide is long standing. Probably the 
first author to have brought it to the forefront was Milton Friedman in his 1949 paper on 
demand theory (Friedman [1949] 1953).
1 A present-day steadfast defender of this standpoint 
is Leijonhufvud (1998, 2006a, 2006b). However the line taken in this paper is different from 
his. As is well known, several more or less incompatible trends are present in Marshall’s 
writings. For Leijonhufvud, his biological and institutional insights are the most interesting 
ones.  For  example,  to  him,  Marshall’s  economic  agents  adopt  an  adaptive,  procedural 
rationality instead of being engaged in optimizing behavior. Whenever such a line is taken, 
the issue of the relationship between Marshall and Walras is easily sealed: they are poles 
apart.  My  claim  is  that  there  exists  a  Marshall/Walras  divide  even  when  Marshall  is 
considered to be a straight neoclassical as opposed to be an evolutionist or institutionalist 
economist  —  that  is,  whenever  Book  V  of  his  Principles  (1920),  the  object  of  which  is 
equilibrium or value theory, is considered his central contribution to economic theory.  
To  make  my  point,  I  shall  compare  the  two  approaches  with  respect  to  the  following 
benchmarks: the purpose of economic theory according to Marshall and Walras, their views 
on the role of mathematics, their way of broaching the working of the economy as whole, the 
conception of equilibrium underpinning their theories, and, finally, their trade organization 
assumptions.  
 
II. General purpose  
The following statement aptly captures Marshall’s theoretical purpose:  
Marshallian theory is problem oriented in the following sense: 1) that it is focused on 
actual problems from the world of experience; 2) that one begins analysis of a problem 
well-armed with observed and related facts; 3) that the structure of analysis is dictated 
by the specific problem one is dealing with; 4) that real world institutions are accounted 
for  and  dealt  with;  5)  that  definitions  of  terms  are  problem  specific;  and  6)  that 
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mathematical considerations do not take a dominant place in the analysis. (Hammond 
1992: 226) 
In the same vein, Whitaker characterizes Marshall as “an author dubious about the value of 
unadorned theory and anxious to adapt that thinking to an ever-changing reality” (Whitaker 
1990: 220). To Marshall, according to the celebrated expression, economic theory was an 
engine for the discovery of concrete truth. His purpose was to explain everyday business, to 
solve practical issues — such as the question of what the impact of an increase in demand will 
be on the price of a particular good?  
In contrast, Walras was interested in matters of principle, in questions of a more philosophical 
nature  —  in  particular,  the  logical  existence  and  the  efficiency  of  the  equilibrium  of  a 
decentralized economy, a query that can be traced back to Adam Smith’s attempt to elucidate 
the mechanism behind his invisible hand metaphor. However, Walras addressed this issue at 
an incomparably higher level of abstraction than Smith. He was well aware that his theory 
was about an ideal type, a theoretical parable. To him, the role of theory vis-à-vis reality was 
to be a foil, an ideal to be attained, not a description of reality. 
The physico-mathematical sciences, like the mathematical sciences, in the narrow sense, 
do go beyond experience as soon as they have drawn their type concepts from it. From 
real-type concepts, these sciences abstract ideal-type concepts from which they define, 
and then on the basis of these definitions they construct a priori the whole framework of 
their theorems and proofs. After that they go back to experience not to confirm but to 
apply their conclusions. … Following the same procedure, the pure theory of economics 
ought  to  take  over  from  experience  certain  type  concepts,  like  those  of  exchange, 
supply, demand, market, capital, income, productive services and products. From these 
real-type concepts the pure science of economics should then abstract and define ideal-
type concepts in terms of which it carries on its reasoning. The return to reality should 
not take place until the science is completed and then only with a view to practical 
applications. Thus in an ideal market we have ideal prices which stand in an exact 
relation to an ideal demand and supply. (In the same way, Walras, dissociating himself 
from Pareto’s viewpoint, wrote that “Pareto believes that the aim of science is to come 
closer to reality through successive approximations. I, for one, believe that the eventual 
aim of science is to bring reality close to a certain ideal. This is why I formulate this 
ideal” (Walras 2000: 567, own translation).  
A similar testimony appears in Walras’ annotation on p. 17 of his copy of Cournot’s Principes 
de la théorie de la richesse, held at the Centre Walras-Pareto of the University of Lausanne, 
where  he  wrote  “la  théorie  pure  n’attend  aucune  confirmation  de  la  réalité” (pure  theory 
requires no confirmation from reality), quoted in Baranzani, R. and P. Bridel (2005, p. 360, 
note 3). Another testimony is Walras’s following dissenting comment on Pareto:  3 
 
Pareto believes that the aim of science is to come closer to reality through successive 
approximations. I, for one, believe that the eventual aim of science is to bring reality 




III. The role of mathematics  
Walras and Marshall were also poles apart over the role of mathematics, a rather ironic state 
of  affairs.  Marshall,  who  had  received  a  mathematical  education,  was  convinced  that 
mathematics  should  have  only  a  limited,  ancillary  role. 
5  In  contrast,  Walras,  a  poor 
mathematician,  strongly  believed  that  mathematical  economics  was  the  future  of  the 
discipline. In his words: 
The whole theory is mathematical. Although it may be described in ordinary language, 
the  proof  of  the  theory  must  be  given  mathematically.  It  is  only  with  the  aid  of 
mathematics that I can understand what is meant by the condition of maximum utility. 
(Walras, Preface to the Fourth edition of the Element, 1954: 43). 
6 
For  his  part,  Marshall  moved  in  the  opposite  direction,  from  giving  pride  of  place  to 
mathematics and graphs in his early writings to relegating these to footnotes and appendices 
in the Principles:  
But I know I had a growing feeling in the later years of my work at the subject that a 
good mathematical theorem dealing with economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be 
good economics: and I went more and more on the rules – (1) Use Mathematics as a 
shorthand language rather than as an engine of inquiry. (2) Keep to them until you have 
done. (3) Translate into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples that are important in 
real life. (5) Burn the mathematics. (6) If you can’t succeed in (4), burn (3). This last I 
did often. I believe in Newton’s Principia methods, because they carry so much of the 
                                                 
2 It ought to be admitted, however, that Walras did not always stick to this radical standpoint. For example, his 
remarks  at  the end of the Elements, referring to the need to go from point-in-time analysis to  the study of 
continuous markets, suggests the opposite, namely that theoretical progress means coming closer to reality! 
5 It ought to be admitted, however, that Walras did not always stick to this radical standpoint. For example, his 
remarks at the end of the Elements, referring to the need to go from point-in-time analysis to the study of 
continuous markets, suggests the opposite, namely that theoretical progress means coming closer to reality! 
6 “As to mathematical language, why should I persist in using everyday language to explain things in the most 
cumbrous and incorrect way, as Ricardo has done and as John Stuart Mill does repeatedly in his Principles of 
Political  Economy,  when  these  same  things  can  be  stated  far  more  succinctly,  precisely  and  clearly  in  the 
language of mathematics?” (Walras 1954: 71–72). 4 
 
ordinary mind with them. Mathematics used in a Fellowship thesis by a man who is not 
a mathematician by nature ― and I have come across a good deal of that ― seems to 
me an unmixed evil. And I think you should do all you can to prevent people from using 
Mathematics in cases in which the English language is as short as the Mathematical… 
(Letter to Bowley, dated February 27, 1906; Whitaker 1996: 130). 
7 
According  to  Groenewegen,  an  important  reason  for  Marshall’s  reservations  about  giving 
mathematics an important place in economic theory was his growing fear of the consequences 
of pursuing the logic of mathematical reasoning to the limit: 
An economist’s ‘greed’ for facts was an essential countervailing force to the thrill of the 
chase  mathematical  reasoning  provided,  if  contact  with  reality  of  that  economics 
[sic] was to be preserved (Groenewegen 1995: 413). 
It  is  noteworthy,  that  Marshall  has  hardly  been  taken  at  his  word  about  the  role  of 
mathematics. Subsequent commentators, such as Irving Fisher, have found it appropriate to 
praise  him  for  having  fostered  the  development  of  mathematical  economics.
8  Many  of 
Marshall’s disciples, though still prone to defend empirical relevance against mathematical 
elegance,  largely  abandoned  his  banning  of  mathematics.  Therefore  when  it  comes  to 
Marshallian economics, rather than to the economics of Marshall, the difference in the role of 
mathematics between the Marshallian and the Walrasian approach becomes only a matter of 
degree.  
 
IV. Broaching the study of the economy as a whole 
“Man’s powers are limited”, Marshall stated, while “almost every one of nature’s riddle is 
complex” (1920: 366). “Breaking up a complex question, studying one bit at a time, and at 
last combining his partial solutions with a supreme effort of his whole small strength into 
some sort of an attempt at a solution of the whole riddle” (Marshall 1920: 366) was the 
solution he favored. In line with this, he proposed, first, to divide the economy into industries, 
to be studied separately, and, second, since the analysis of time was so tricky, to distinguish 
three time categories: the market day (the unit period of exchange); the short period; and the 
                                                 
7 See also the Preface to the Fifth Edition of the Principles (Marshall 1898) and Marshall’s 1908 or 1909 letter to 
Colson (Whitaker 1996: 228). 
8 In Fisher’s words: “But the progress of the new method during this period was small compared with that which 
followed  the  appearance  of  Marshall’s  first  volume.  This  work,  which  immediately  took  rank  among  the 
foremost treatises, has spread the mathematical ideas far and wide. Many who had never heard of mathematical 
economics  began  to  give  it  serious  consideration.  Naturally,  the  old  disputes  broke  out  afresh.  Marshall’s 
diagrams and formulae were called dangerous, falsely accurate, academic playthings. But Marshall’s moderate 
and judicial tone in treating of the utility of mathematics, his relegation of all his mathematics to footnotes and 
appendices, won his readers, and at the same time showed plainly lacunae in the text wherever mathematical 
notes were examined. The reader’s prejudice melted away as he discovered their extreme simplicity, and found 
them throwing light into many dark corners of economic theory”. (Fisher 1898: 136) 5 
 
long  period.  This  strategy  amounted  to  postponing  the  study  of  the  functioning  of  the 
economy as a whole, i.e. the piecing together of these partial results. As Clower and Due 
(1972:  58)  put  it,  “Partial  equilibrium  analysis  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  market 
interactions; it merely leaves the explicit analysis of such interactions to later analysis”. 
No such two-tier strategy is to be found in Walras’s work. This is premised on the view that, 
from the onset, the object of study  should be an entire economy. Simplifications had, of 
course, to be introduced; but they pertained to the characterization of the economy as a whole 
and did not involve dividing it into separate sub-entities. Walras started his analysis with the 
most rudimentary economy possible, a two-good exchange economy, where the two goods 
(oats and wheat) constituted the entire economy. The principle determining the equilibrium of 
this simple economy having been established, Walras went on to consider a slightly more 
complicated  economy,  an  n-good  exchange  economy.  His  next  step  was  to  introduce 
production into the picture. In the end, he had a chain of encompassing models, starting from 
the  simplest  and  moving  towards  more  and  more  completeness:  the  two-good  exchange-
economy model, the n-good exchange-economy model, the production model, the capital-
formation and credit-economy model and, finally, the monetary-economy model. 
Figure 1 illustrates Marshall and Walras’s alternative strategies diagrammatically. 6 
 
 






Marshall made it his priority to study the particular rectangles in the upper part of Figure 1 
(branches of the economy during a given time span) separately. Marshall’s point was not that 
theory should be confined to the study of a single ‘rectangle’. It was rather that economists 
needed to proceed gradually. For example, in his fishing industry example, Marshall studied 
the  gravitational  process  between  market-day,  short-period  and  long-period  equilibrium 
within an industry — that is, in terms of the Figure, he looked at vertical connections. He also 
endeavored to construct horizontal connections.
9 Moreover, in Note XXI of the Principles’ 
Mathematical Appendix, he provided “a bird’s eye view of the problems of joint demand, 
composite demand, joint supply and composite supply when they all rise together”, and made 
the point that, however complicated the problem might become, it was theoretical determined 
since the number of unknowns was equal to the number of equations (1920: 885).  
Nonetheless, all in all, in the Principles, no serious attempt is made to tackle the study of the 
economy as a whole.
10  
Marshall’s treatment of market interdependence fell far short of a full theory of general 
equilibrium on Walrasian lines. Even when formalizing market interdependence in the 
mathematical appendix to the Principles, he simply treated the demand or supply of 
each commodity as a function of nothing but the price of the commodity itself. The 
links between the generation of income in factor markets and the expenditure of that 
income in product markets were left quite vague. Again, it must be recalled that the 
development  of  comprehensive,  fully  articulated,  equilibrium  theories  was  not 
Marshall’s aim. (Whitaker 1987: 360) 
To summarize, Marshall was adept at breaking up complex problems into elementary parts, 
which were then studied in isolation. By contrast, Walras’s strategy consisted of simplifying 
the economy to the extreme without ever departing from the study of a complete economy. To 
use an image, Marshallian theory can be compared to a roadmap. Such maps cover a specific 
area. The larger their scale, the more detailed the picture of the real configuration of the 
terrain they are able to provide, but the smaller the area covered. In turn, Walrasian theory can 
be compared to a globe, which represents the whole earth at once, illuminating the relative 
positions of the different oceans and continents. Each of these two strategies has it pros and 
cons. The Marshallian strategy permits a detailed study of particular topics. However, its 
drawback is that the delineation of its subject of study is always arbitrary. Strictly speaking, 
no industry or market can be separated from the rest of the economy. Hence, the ceteris 
                                                 
9 “Thus we begin by isolating the primary relationship of supply, demand and price in regard to a particular 
commodity: we reduce to inaction all other forces by the phrase “other things being equal”. … The next step is to 
set more forces free from the hypothetical slumber imposed on them; and to call into activity, for instance, 
changes  in  the  demand  for  hides  when  considering  the  price  of  beef”  (Preface  of  the  Fifth  edition  of  The 
Principles, 1898). 
10 For the opposite viewpoint, see Dimand (1990). 8 
 
paribus assumption is always a coup. Moreover, the piecing together phase has proven to be 
an  extremely  difficult  task.  In  view  of  this  difficulty,  Walras’s  decision  to  consider  the 
economy as a whole from the outset of his investigation looks clever. But the drawback of this 




Equilibrium is at the core of both Marshall’s and Walras’s reasoning. Both of them adopted 
the stationary equilibrium conception in which equilibrium is defined as a state of rest. 
11 
However, their priorities were different. Walras’s main aim was to demonstrate the logical 
existence  of  general  equilibrium,  a  state  where  all  agents’  optimizing  trading  plans  are 
compatible. He did not sidestep the question of the formation of equilibrium (i.e. the issue of 
how the logically existing equilibrium state is reached) but when a conflict between these two 
aims arose, he gave the priority to the logical existence of equilibrium. In sharp contrast, 
Marshall was little interested in demonstrating that equilibrium existed logically, contenting 
himself with assuming that this was the case. His priority was the study of adjustment towards 
equilibrium. Both authors adhered to the subjective theory of value and accepted the principle 
that economic outcomes found their starting point in agents’ optimizing behavior. They both 
grounded the demand for goods on marginal utility (Marshall in Book III, Chapter 3 of the 
Principles,  Walras  in  Lessons  8  and  9  of  the  Elements)  but  Walras  gave  a  formal 
demonstration of the transition from optimizing behavior to demand, while Marshall hardly 
bothered with this aspect. 
Moreover,  their  differences  were  more  than  a  matter  of  priority.  There  was  a  deeper, 
conceptual difference. The best way to bring it out is to investigate the role of disequilibrium 
in their theories.  
Disequilibrium in Marshallian theory 
12 
In Marshall’s value theory, two equilibrium concepts co-exist, market-day equilibrium (in 
short, market equilibrium) and normal equilibrium, which works as a centre of gravity for 
market equilibrium.
13 Hence there are also two adjustment processes. Marshall studied the 
process of adjustment towards market equilibrium in his corn model in Chapter II of Book V 
                                                 
11  The  following  quote  from  Lucas  nicely  captures  the  gist  of  the  stationary-equilibrium  standpoint:  “The 
underlying idea seems to be taken from physics, as referring to a system ‘at rest’. In economics, I suppose such a 
static  equilibrium corresponds to  a prediction  as  to how  an economy would behave  should external shocks 
remain fixed over a long period, so that households and firms would adjust to facing the same set of prices over 
and over again and attune their behavior accordingly” (Lucas, [1980] 1981: 278). 
12 For a more detailed analysis, see De Vroey (2007). 
13 Nowadays, the short/long period equilibrium distinction has replaced Marshall’s distinction between market 
equilibrium and normal equilibrium. I stick to Marshall’s original distinction, which is less ambiguous. 9 
 
of the Principles. There, he offers two explanations for the attainment of market equilibrium 
(the matching of market supply and demand or market clearing). The most appealing one 
admits disequilibrium trade, i.e. exchanges can take place at ‘false prices’, to borrow Hicks’s 
expression. States of disequilibrium, meaning a departure from market equilibrium, thus have 
an  effective  existence.  However,  the  outcome  of  the  adjustment  process  is  only  slightly 
different from that which would have occurred without false trading: the final price is the 
same as the ‘true equilibrium’ price (Marshall’s expression), the total quantity traded is also 
the same; only agents’ money balances are different. This result is obtained because Marshall 
assumes that the marginal utility of money is constant, itself a consequence of the assumption 
that an agent’s expenditure in the market under consideration represents only a small fraction 
of his or her total income. Hence income effects are discarded. Unfortunately, this assumption 
is ad hoc, and cannot be generalized. For the general case, Marshall is compelled to fall back 
on a less attractive explanation, the assumption that all agents hold perfect information about 
market conditions. This gives them the ability to mentally reconstruct its equilibrium values. 
In this case, market clearing is always present.  
However, if disequilibrium states are discarded as far as market equilibrium is concerned, 
there is still room for them when it comes to the formation of normal equilibrium. It takes 
time for a new normal-equilibrium position to be attained after a shock has disturbed an 
earlier one. During this process, the market is in a state of disequilibrium, now understood as 
a  discrepancy  between  market  and  normal  prices  and  quantities,  rather  than  as  a  lack  of 
market clearing. This possible co-existence of market clearing and disequilibrium is, in my 
eyes,  the  hallmark  of  the  Marshallian  conception  of  equilibrium.  Oddly  enough,  most 
commentators  are  unaware  of  it.  Instead,  they  take  it  for  granted  that  Marshallian 
disequilibrium means market non-clearing, a contamination of the Marshallian conception by 
the Walrasian, to which I now turn. 
Disequilibrium in Walrasian theory  
Is there room for states of disequilibrium in Walras’s theory? The answer is ‘Yes’ according 
to the first edition of the Elements but ‘No’ according to the fourth and fifth editions! Over the 
editions, Walras changed the meaning of tâtonnement.
 14 Initially, disequilibrium trade was 
allowed, but later it was denied. The exact changes made were as follows. In the first edition, 
disequilibrium trade was present in Walras’s various models. In the second edition, following 
Bertrand’s criticism in his 1883 review (Bertrand 1883), Walras introduced the ‘no trade out 
of equilibrium’ assumption into his exchange model (exchanges being suspended as long as 
the market is out of equilibrium), but kept disequilibrium trading in the production model. 
Walras’s final standpoint emerged in the fourth edition, where the absence of disequilibrium 
                                                 
14 See Jaffé (1983, Chapter 14) and Donzelli (2007). 10 
 
trade was extended to all models and the ‘ticket’ scenario was introduced. The rationale for 
these changes was Walras’s growing awareness that disequilibrium trade generated income 
effects. These result in a failure of the economy to converge towards the equilibrium values 
calculated  in  the  logical  existence  of  equilibrium  study.  Faced  with  a  dilemma  between 
logical consistency and realism, Walras eventually decided that logic had to have the upper 
hand.
15 
In  the  earlier  stages  of  Walras’s  theory,  its  underlying  time  frame  was  unclear.  Was  it 
concerned with a long-lasting single period of exchange or with a succession of such periods? 
No answer is available. After, the exclusion of false trading the matter becomes clearer. At 
least as far as his exchange and production models are concerned, Walras’s theory pertains to 
a  given  period  of  exchange.  Since  the  tâtonnement  process  is  supposed  to  take  place 
instantaneously, no duration needs to be ascribed to this period.  
The contrast between Walras’s and Marshall’s conceptions is then as follows. In Walras’s 
theory, first, disequilibrium has only a virtual existence (it is eliminated before becoming 
effective), and, second, market clearing and equilibrium are one and the same thing. Neither 
of these features are present in the Marshallian conception. 
The discussion above relates to the static Walrasian model. While a first rough attempt at a 
dynamic  analysis  is  to  be  found  in  Walras  capital  formation  and  credit  model,  a  more 
complete treatment had to await Hicks’s Value and Capital book (1939) and the development 
of  neo-Walrasian  theory.  In  his  book,  Hicks  distinguishes  between  point-in-time  and 
intertemporal outcomes. Equilibrium, meaning market clearing, is a permanent characteristic 
of the first outcome but disequilibrium, now meaning the non-fulfillment of expectations, is a 
possible occurrence in the second. Thus Hicks brings disequilibrium back into the picture. 
However, no falling back on the Marshallian conception ensues. The underlying reason is that 
neo-Walrasian theory abandons the stationary-equilibrium perspective adopted by Marshall 
(and from which Walras himself was unable to depart fully, although consistency required it). 
The stationary-equilibrium perspective rests on the assumption that the data of the economy 
remain  unchanged  over  the  period  of  analysis,  except  for  reversible  changes.
  Irreversible 
changes, however small they may be, are confined to the time between periods of analysis. 
Hence they are not analyzed, since the exclusive concern of a stationary-equilibrium theory is 
what goes on during a period of analysis. As noted by Donzelli (1989: 158), this is a dramatic 
shortcoming: “such models are structurally incapable of providing the slightest explanation of 
any  economic  phenomenon  whose  occurrence  essentially  depends  on  economic  activities 
                                                 
15 Walrasian scholars differ in their judgment of Walras’s deletion of false trading in the fourth edition of the 
Elements. To Jaffé and Donzelli, this deletion is in accordance with the overall logic of Walras’s reasoning. By 
contrast, Walker (1996) thinks that the fourth edition marks a regression As explained in De Vroey (1999a), I 
basically agree with Jaffé and Donzelli. 
17 See De Vroey (1999b) for further discussion of this point. 11 
 
taking  place  in  time”.  In  contrast,  neo-Walrasian  theory  is  able  to  consider  both  the 
adjustment  towards  intertemporal  equilibrium  and  changes  in  intertemporal  equilibrium 
positions.  
 
VI.  The  Walrasian  market  versus  the  Marshallian  market;  the  Walrasian  economy 
versus the Marshallian economy 
Let me start by making a statement, which looks like a tautology: a market economy consists 
of  markets.  When  Marshall’s  and  Walras’s  contributions  are  considered  against  this 
background, the idea of a division of labor between Marshall and Walras looks compelling: 
Marshall concerned himself with the study of parts, the markets, Walras with that of the 
whole. The first is partial equilibrium, the second general equilibrium. In this framework, why 
bother with a Marshallian general equilibrium theory? As Schumpeter put it in his  semi-
centennial appraisal of Marshall’s Principles, “A full elaboration of the theory of general 
equilibrium [by Marshall] could only have duplicated the work of Walras” ([1941] 1952: 
100). 
But what if the proposition, that a market economy consists of markets, rests on a confusion 
about the meaning of the term ‘market’? What if, in other words,  the term “market” means 
something different in Marshallian and Walrasian theory? In my opinion, this is the case. In 
the Marshallian framework, a market is a specific institutional set-up permitting the exchange 
of  a  given  good  or  service  against  money,  in  isolation  from  exchanges  involving  other 
commodities. Each market is a separate locus for the formation of a partial equilibrium. This 
is also the common-sense understanding of the notion. In the Walrasian approach, the notion 
of a market is associated with a given good or service. This approach holds that general 
equilibrium is attained whenever the excess demand is nil in all markets. However, when a 
Walrasian economist, commenting on the Walrasian model, states that at a given price vector 
the market for corn fails to clear, he or she just means that the excess demand for corn is not 
zero. Nothing would be lost if the equilibrium conditions were rephrased in this way without 
mentioning the word market. Here, the market notion does not refer to the existence of a 
specific institutional set-up where the equilibrium price of corn against money is formed. The 
set-up  in  which  the  equilibrium  quantity  of  corn  traded  is  arrived  at  is  the  tâtonnement 
process,  which  encompasses  the  joint  formation  of  equilibrium  prices  for  all  goods  and 
services.  So,  the  Walrasian  economy  constitutes  a  single  Marshallian  market  —  a  grand 
market for that matter, so huge that no real-world counterpart for it can be conceived of.  
The view that there is continuity between the Marshallian market and the Walrasian economy 
ought thus to be foregone: the generalization of a Marshallian market does not lead to  a 
Walrasian  economy;  conversely,  the  Walrasian  economy  is  not  composed  of  Marshallian 
markets (in the plural!).
17 In other words, extending the Marshallian market into a complete 12 
 
economy does not lead to a Walrasian economy but to a different construct, the Marshallian 
economy.  
This last remark suggests that som further reflection on the notion of an economy is needed. 
In the general-equilibrium literature, this notion is usually understood in a narrow sense as 
referring to a list of agents (with their endowments, preferences and objectives), a list of 
commodities and a list of firms (with their ownership structure and technical constraints). 
This account is incomplete due to its silence on the subject of the functioning of the economy. 
Such neglect is due to the fact that the task usually assigned to general equilibrium theory is to 
analyze the existence, uniqueness, stability and welfare characteristics of the equilibrium of a 
given  economy  at  any  given  point  in  time  and  over  time.  However,  the  theoretical 
investigation  should  not  be  restricted  to  this  task.  The  economy  whose  equilibrium  is 
discussed ought also to be depicted as a social system, comprising a set of institutions, trade 
arrangements, rules of the game, and means of communication between agents. Without these 
factors, the issue of the attainment of equilibrium cannot be tackled in earnest. In other words, 
the  following  question  cannot  be  sidestepped:  granted  that,  for  a  given  economy,  some 
equilibrium values logically exist, what institutional conditions are needed for these values to 
be attained? Clearly, the answer to this question needs to go beyond the usual ‘market forces’ 
and ‘invisible hand’ metaphors.  
The Walrasian economy 
A principle feature of the Walrasian economy is its integrated character. A Walrasian general 
equilibrium consists of a unique, multilateral contract bearing on all goods, and involving all 
agents. Equilibrium is reached at one stroke, under the auctioneer’s auspices. Everything takes 
place simultaneously and in each trade round the formation of equilibrium occurs in logical 
time. Actual transactions remain suspended until the equilibrium price vector is arrived at — 
otherwise income effects would arise. Once the institutional dimension has been taken into 
account, the auctioneer hypothesis turns out to  be central. Usually, Walrasian economists 
accept  its  presence  in  their  theory  only  grudgingly.  From  my  perspective,  it  becomes  a 
compelling ingredient of Walrasian theory (even if Walras did not explicitly introduce it). I 
am willing to go so far as to claim that Walrasian theory and the auctioneer hypothesis are 
part and parcel of each other — all of which shows how artificial a construction the Walrasian 
economy is. 
It  ought  to  be  remarked  that  the  propositions,  “the  Walrasian  economy  is  perfectly 
competitive” and “in a Walrasian economy equilibrium prices are formed by the auctioneer”, 
amount to the same thing. Perfect competition is defined by the fact that agents are price-
takers. Hence prices have to be formed by a non-agent, such as the auctioneer.  
Three implications of adopting the auctioneer hypothesis must be emphasized. First, in an 
auctioneer-led economy, agents do not need information about excess demand functions and 13 
 
their underpinnings. As Kirman (2006: XV) put it, “assuming the Walrasian auctioneer, little 
information is needed by individual agents; the information has all been processed for them”. 
More precisely, agents’ domain of information pertains to the quality of goods and services 
traded, past values and the states of the world. Second, whenever the auctioneer assumption is 
made, price flexibility follows. As Lucas points out, once it is admitted that the auctioneer is 
an artifact introduced to dodge the thorny problem of price formation, it makes little sense to 
impede it from doing its job of bringing prices to their equilibrium values (Lucas 1987: 52). 
Third and finally, the auctioneer hypothesis and imperfect competition run counter each other. 
This follows from reflecting on the communication structure of an auctioneer-led system. The 
auctioneer economy is a set of bilateral relationships between the auctioneer and isolated 
individual agents. Before the attainment of equilibrium, agents’ exclusive social link is with 
the auctioneer. They do not interact or communicate with each other. As a result, whenever a 
given agent makes a trading offer by responding to the prices announced by the auctioneer, he 
or she does not know how many other agents are making a similar offer. An agent can be in a 
monopolistic position without being aware of it, and so is unable to take advantage of it!
  The 
same  point  can  be  made  by  looking  at  things  from  the  information  point  of  view.  In  an 
auctioneer economy, agents have no knowledge of market excess demand functions. This 
feature runs counter to the central trait of monopoly or oligopoly theory, that the agent with 
market power knows the objective demand function for the good he or she is selling. Hence 
the  tâtonnement  set-up  itself  guarantees  the  ‘perfectness’  of  competition,  whatever 
monopolistic factors may be present in the economy.  
In short, Walrasian theory and price rigidity are incompatible bedfellows. Walrasian theory 
and  imperfect  competition  are  also  incompatible  bedfellows.  All  this  is  a  direct  result  of 
adopting the auctioneer assumption.  
A final aspect to be considered is whether a Walrasian economy is monetary. For the sake of 
differentiating between the Walrasian and Marshallian approaches, it suffices to note that the 
presence of money in Walrasian theory is at best problematic while, as will be seen, it is a 
compelling presence in the Marshallian approach.
18 
The Marshallian economy  
The Marshallian notion of an economy cannot be derived directly from Marshall’s writings, 
since the study of an economy as a whole was not his concern. However, the trade technology 
that would have underpinned his general equilibrium analysis, had he been able to construct 
                                                 
18 Ostroy (1992: 784) states that “By introducing money after he had completed his theory of exchange, Walras 
clearly made monetary phenomena an optional ad-on rather than an integral component of the mechanism of 
exchange”. Hahn has made the same point repeatedly. “There is nothing I can say about the equilibrium of an 
economy with money which I cannot also say about the equilibrium of a non-monetary economy, [that is] the 
money of this construction is only a contingent store of value and has no other role” (Hahn [1973] 1984: 160). 14 
 
it, can be derived by extrapolating from the institutional set-up upon which Marshall’s partial 
equilibrium analysis is based. 
A Marshallian economy comprises separate markets, each of which is a separate locus for the 
formation of market equilibrium. Unlike Walras, Marshall assumed that production occurs in 
advance of trade. Thus a Marshallian economy is a sequence economy where input markets 
occurs in advance of goods markets. Households enter the goods markets with an income 
originating from the sales of their services in the factors markets, and the distribution of 
profits  from  earlier  market-days.  Therefore  a  Marshallian  economy  is  typically  a  dual-
decision hypothesis system (Clower [1965] 1984).
19 
Another feature of the Marshallian economy is its monetary character. Money is present from 
the beginning of Marshall’s analysis of the market. In fact, it forms part of the definition of a 
market as an institutional arrangement whereby a given good is exchanged for money.  
In Marshall’s model the price formation process occurs without an auctioneer. Agents are 
price-quantity  makers.  As  discussed  above,  the  linchpin  of  the  formation  of  market 
equilibrium is agents’ ability to mentally reconstruct market demand and supply functions. 
The  information  attributed  to  agents  is  thus  significantly  greater  than  in  the  Walrasian 
economy. They need to assess relevant market supply and demand functions on their own. 
Therefore, they must be informed about the relevant underlying private data.  
As far as competition is concerned, Marshall himself had the knack of saying both that his 
theory did not feature perfect competition (1920: 541), and that he assumed that “the forces of 
supply and demand have free play” (1920: 341). Clearly these statements are incompatible. 
Turning to the writings of subsequent Marshallians, such as to Frank Knight, a clearer image 
emerges (Knight 1921: 76 seq.). Knight posited nine requirements for perfect competition 
amongst which were perfect mobility, perfect communication between individuals, and the 
exclusion of all forms of collusion. What is interesting for my purposes, is Knight’s view that 
these assumptions are “idealizations or purifications of tendencies which hold good more or 
less in reality”. This means that he accepted that perfect competition is a matter of degree. In 
other words, the Marshallian economy, unlike the Walrasian one, admits departures from 
perfect competition. The presence of the auctioneer is an impediment to the introduction of 
imperfect information and rigidity in the Walrasian set up. The absence of the auctioneer in 
the Marshallian economy permits their introduction.
20 
                                                 
19 As Leijonhufvud (1998: 28) put it: “The dual decision hypothesis may seem contrived from the standpoint of 
the kind of neo-Walrasian choice theory which compels all decisions to be made simultaneously once and for all. 
But from a Marshallian dynamic standpoint, sequential decision-making is as natural as it is common-sensical”. 
20 The next step is to argue that monopolistic competition general equilibrium models ought to be viewed as 
marking the foundations of Marshallian general equilibrium analysis. 15 
 
Table 1 summarizes the contrasts between the Walrasian and the Marshallian economies that 
have been identified in this paper. 
Table 1. Trade organization in Walrasian and Marshallian economies 
 
VII. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper was to substantiate the claim that the Walrasian and the Marshallian 
approaches  constitute  alternative  sub-research  programs  within  the  wider  neoclassical 
paradigm.  I  have  shown  that,  when  it  comes  to  the  role  of  mathematics,  the  difference 
between them is only a matter of degree. But the differences are deeper with reference to 
other benchmarks, such as the strategy adopted for studying the economy as a whole, and the 
conception of equilibrium and trade organization.  
As  a  final  point, let  me  stress  that,  unlike  most  defenders  of  the  Marshall/Walras  divide 
viewpoint, I do not claim that one approach is superior to the other (usually, the divide claim 
is made by critics of the Walrasian approach). Had I taken this standpoint, I would not have 
claimed that these approaches are alternative programs, each having their pros and cons as 
well as their ebbs and flows.  
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